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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

RUSSELL BOURNE RASBAND,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaint iff-Respondent,
vs.
CAROL T. RASBAND,

Case No. 87-0081-CA

Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to the
provisions of S 78-2a-3(2)(g) , UTAH CODE ANN. (1953).

This is an

appeal of some of the provisions of a decree of divorce effecting
the

rulings of

the Honorable

Rodney

S. Page

of

the Second

Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, made
after a one day trial.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
permanent

The

alimony

to

failure
the

of

the

appellant

trial

after

a

court

to

award

twenty-nine

and

one-half- year marriage which commenced a few months after she
graduated

from

full-time

basis

high
and

school,
has

has

never

recently

been

been

employed

employed

in

on

a

only

minimum-wage, part-time employment, while respondent can afford
the requested permanent

alimony which

is consistent with the

marital standard of living, constitutes error which should be
corrected by this court.
2.

The trial court failed to equitably divide the

real and personal property of the properties, in view of the fact
that only the respondent had a demonstrated earning capacity and
the assets with which to produce

income while the appellant,

after twenty-nine and one-half years as a mother-housewife with a
high school education and only part-time minimum wage employment
experience who will be required to maintain a home for herself
and her mentally-impaired daughter, must sell the family home and
divide

the proceeds

of

sale within

three

(3) years

of

the

divorce.
3.

The failure of the trial court to award adequate

attorney's fees to the appellant was an error which must be
corrected by this court.
STATUTES
Section 30-3-5 (1), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953), the statute
which governs most of the issues of this appeal provides, in its
relevant portions:
When a decree of divorce is rendered,
the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and
parties.
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) provides:
The Court may order either party to
pay to the clerk a sum of money . . .
to
enable such [adverse] party to prosecute or
defend the action.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married for twenty-nine and one-half
years.

Respondent married

graduated from high school.

appellant a few months after she
During the course of their marriage,

the respondent worked while the appellant was a mother, housewife
and work assistant to the respondent.
commenced

working

insurance

agents

income.

for State
in which

Farm

In 1977, the respondent

Insurance

capacity

he

as a manager of

earned

a substantial

In January of 1985 the respondent voluntarily changed

jobs and became an agent for State Farm Insurance.

This resulted

in a decline in income which he knew would occur when he made the
switch from manager to agent.
Throughout the marriage, appellant remained at home and
cared for the family, although she did assist the respondent in
his work and periodically took part-time jobs for which she was
paid a minimum wage.
The parties had four children, all of whom have reached
the age of emancipation.

However, one of the children, Shelley,

suffers from a disabling mental impairment.

This has resulted,

in the opinion of the psychologists and psychiatrist who examined
her, in a condition which will prevent Shelley from ever being
self-sufficient.

She will be dependent upon her parents or some

agency to provide basic support for her.

The appellant has

provided a home and guidance for Shelley throughout her life and
continues

to do so.

Since

separation
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of

the parties, the

respondent

has had very

little contact with Shelley

and knows

very little about her activities.
Based

on

these

facts,

the

trial

court

divided

the

personal and real property of the parties equally between them
and awarded the appellant alimony which declines over a 10-year
period then continues at the rate of a dollar per year.
Appellant believes that since the respondent
his work experience to set up his own business and
respondent
with

the

who desired
responsiblity

to terminate
of

the marriage,

providing

a

home

for

utilized

it was the
leaving

her

herself

and

Shelley while making use of his business experience and assets to
establish

his

own

business,

the

trial

court

erred

in

its

decision.

Appellant asserts that, under the facts, an equitable

division of the parties1 assets required at minimum that she be
awarded the equity of the parties

in their home as well as the

furniture, fixtures, furnishings, appliances and personal effects
that were awarded

to her.

The court declined

to do this and

ordered that the home be sold within three years.
It is appellant's position that this is an inequitable
award.
The

court

awarded

the

appellant

declining

alimony

despite the fact that she has not had any education since high
school and has only limited, part-time work experience.

This,

she asserts, is in violation of the clear guidelines established
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah
1985) and Olsen v. Olsen

704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).

Finally, the appellant seeks an award of reasonable
attorney's fees for her representation both before the trial
court and this court pursuant to S 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953).
She believes the court failed to properly evaluate the complexity
of the case and her need for assistance.

She asserts that the

issues of hidden

the respondent, the

income on the part of

permanent disability of the minor child of the parties and proper
presentation of the issue of alimony required more extensive
efforts than were recognized by the trial court. These justified
both

a higher

attorney's

fee

award

and

an

order

directing

respondent to pay a more substantial portion of them as he is the
only party with income.
FACTS
The appellant graduated from Olympus High School in
May, 1957 and on August 20th married the respondent
Tr. 220).

(R. 72,

There have been four children born as issue of the

marriage (R. 86).

All of them have attained the age of 18 and

graduated from high school (R. 86) but Shelley Rasband, who was
24 years of age at the time of trial, suffers from a disability
caused by shrinkage of her brain tissue (R. 87). While Shelley
does many things by herself, both of the parties agreed that she
could not be left alone (Tr. 160, 229-230).
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The psychologists

and neurologist who evaluated Shelley related that she will never
be self-sufficient or self-supporting (R. 109, Tr. 185-218).
Throughout the marriage of the parties, the appellant
did not hold full-time employment (Tr. 97, 220).

Her longest

period of employment was part-time which she held for a year and
three months (Tr. 221). The last few jobs that she held paid the
minimum wage of $3.35 an hour (Tr. 221).

As of the time of

trial, the appellant testified that she was hindered in seeking
employment

by

(Tr. 220).

transportation

problems

and

inadequate

glasses

She testified she was unable to afford the new

prescription glasses necessary to pursue employment
(Tr. 228-229).

She is also required to provide care for Shelley

who is not independent and has had great difficulty in holding
jobs (Tr. 221-222, 229-230).
Appellant handled the family books and payment of the
bills (Tr. 223).

She also assisted the respondent in carrying

out his business responsibilities and duties (Tr. 51, 133, 236).
During the pendency of the matter, the appellant did
not seek employment as she had transportation problems, could not
read for an extended period as her glasses were not the correct
prescription, and knew that she would need new glasses before
obtaining employment.

In addition, she had to care for her

family (Tr. 220-222, 228-229).
The appellant has had some health problems suffering
from severe migraine headaches, back and neck problems, a thyroid
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problem, spine problems and has undergone leg surgery resulting
in an inability to stay on her legs for long (Tr. 232). While
the appellant has typing skills (Tr. 261, 54), respondent agreed
appellant had never held a full-time job (Tr. 97).
From 1977 through 1984, the respondent was employed as
a manager of insurance agents by State Farm Insurance (Tr. 34).
In January, 1985, he became an agent himself (Tr. 33). He became
an agent by assuming a retiring agent's accounts (Tr. 35,43).

He

did this because he wanted to become an independent contractor
and not be responsible to anyone (Tr. 43), although he knew when
he made this change that there would be a substantial decrease in
his income (Tr. 171-172).
Respondent testified that, in 1983, he had a nervous
breakdown and physical health problems (Tr. 41-42).

He said as a

result of the job change, his health is now better (Tr. 57).
Both of the parties agreed that the appellant supported and
helped the respondent in functioning as a manager but had not
been of assistance to him since he became an agent (Tr. 51,133).
Appellant managed the household on $4,000.00 per month
supplied by respondent while he was a manager (Tr. 224, 225).
She

testified

that

dinners, trips

and merchandise

were all

purchased for the family and the costs were taken as business
expenses

by

respondent

for

tax purposes

(Tr. 236).

While

respondent admitted payment of some personal expenses, through
his business, he declared that most of the expenses which he said
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reduced his gross business income were professional (Tr. 76-91,
162-166).

He did acknowledge that these payments include food,

travel, his car and its expenses, and items of which he made
personal use (Tr. 76-91; 162-166).
In 1985, the parties had a gross business income of
$78,178.00 and a net taxable income of $44,576.00 (Ex. 8 ) . The
parties subtracted from gross business income of $78,128.00 the
sum of $63,118.00 as business expenses on their schedule C.
1984, the parties had a gross

income of

$64,642.00

In

and net

taxable income of $60,642.00 (Ex. 9).

They subtracted business

expenses of $33,562.00 on Schedule C.

In 1983, the parties had

gross taxable
$54,365.00

income of $58,390.00 and net taxable income of

(Ex. 10).

They subtracted

expenses on Schedule C.

$28,430.00 as business

In 1982, the parties had gross taxable

income of $49,214.00 and net taxable income of $45,219.00 (Ex.
11).
C,

They subtracted $24,245.00 as business expenses on Schedule
In 1981, the parties had gross taxable income of $64,650.00

and net taxable income of $45,223.00 (Ex. 12).

They reported

business expenses of $19,427.00 on Schedule C.

In 1980, the

parties had gross taxable income of $67,759.00 and net taxable
income of

$53,255.00

business expenses.

(Ex. 13).

They deducted

$14,045.00 as

In each of these years there is a substantial

reduction of taxable income by those expenses which are shown on
Schedule C of the exhibits as business expenses.

The respondent

was, at the time of trial, grossing approximately $7,000.00 per
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month from his business (Tr. 175, Ex, C) and the court found he
was earning $3,809.00 per month as net business income (R. 73,
88).
During the course of the marriage, the parties had
numerous vacation trips (Ex. 4) which included visits to San
Diego, several trips to Disneyland, Denmark and Sweden, Hawaii,
Germany and Austria, Disney World, San Francisco, Monterey and
Carmel,

the

Bahamas,

Mazatlan,

Acapulco,

Vail

and

Aspen,

Colorado, Jackson Hole, Tetons and Yellowstone, Phoenix, France,
England, Spain, Italy and Germany and Sun Valley (Tr. 134-142,
152-155).
special

While on these trips the parties always picked up

items

like crystal

and

figurines

(Tr. 152, 134-152,

152-155).
The appellant desires to be awarded the family home
(Tr. 243,288).

It was her intention to use the house as a home

for herself and Shelley and to rent part of it to a college
student to assist her in financially maintaining her household
(Tr. 288).
The appellant

retained her counsel by payment of a

retainer of $2,500.00 which was obtained by her daughter cashing
in her IRA and sundry other sources (Tr. 281-282).

She also

testified she has no cash or method by which to pay her counsel
(Tr. 246).

She testified

the divorce was a very difficult

proceeding for her to experience (Tr. 246).
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From this testimony, the court entered a ruling in
which

it

determined

that

Shelley

has

numerous

problems,

(R. 72-80), had some degree of impairment and requested a further
evaluation by Davis County Mental Health as to the extent of that
impairment (R. 101-102).

After that evaluation, a report from

Dr. Thomas E. Pritt was filed.

It transmitted his opinion that

Shelley would never be capable of self support (R. 109).

This

was in accord with the opinion of Dr. Michael Goldstein and Dr.
Sam Goldstein (Tr. 185-218).
The respondent, by changing from an agent manager to an
insurance agent, has produced a substantial
income and fringe benefits (R. 73).
the plaintiff

generates

approximately

reduction

in his

The court determined that
$6,909.00 per month as

gross income from this business and has business expenses of
approximately 50 percent of that gross income (R. 73, 88). The
court further determined that, after paying business expenses,
the respondent has approximately $3,800.00 per month before taxes
to meet family expenses (R. 73, 88).
The court determined that the appellant was unemployed
but had a high school degree, managed the household accounts
during the marriage, assisted the respondent in his business and
"is capable of meaningful employment in the future." (R. 73, 88).
The court determined that the appellant had need for
support between $1,250.00 and $1,400.00 per month (Tr. 74, 88)
despite

the

testimony

of

the appellant
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that she would

need

$2,000.00 per month to maintain a household for herself and
Shelley (Tr. 233) and her need for alimony of $1,500.00 per month
(Tr. 233).
per

month

The respondent has need of approximately $1,500.00
including

funds

for

payment

of

the

family

debts

(Tr. 74, 88). The court determined that residing in the home of
the appellant was an older daughter and friend of the family who
contributed

approximately

$200.00

expenses (Tr. 74, 88, 225-226).

per

month

to

the

family

However, appellant testified

that she anticipated this would terminate in April, 1987, when
the daughter and friend were to be married and set up their own
household (Tr. 271, 284).
The court determined that the parties had acquired a
home in Kaysville, Utah, which had a market value of approximately $125,000.00 and on which they owe approximately $52,000.00
(R. 74, 89, Tr. 24).

The court determined that child support

should be paid by the respondent at the rate of $250.00 per month
(R. 76, 102), then valued and divided the personal property of
the parties

approximately

equally

(R. 76-77, 102-103).

The

respondent was ordered to assume and pay the debts incurred by
the family (R. 77, 103-104).

The appellant was awarded the home

of the parties subject to payment of the mortgage (R. 77, 104),
but was directed to appraise the home within 30 days with each
party to pay one-half that cost (R. 77, 104). The respondent was
ordered to be paid $9,992.00 as reimbursement for payment of
family

debts, plus

$5,400.00

to
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equalize

the

value

of

the

personal property of the parties, then, the remaining equity was
to be divided equally (R. 77, 104), The respondent was awarded a
lien against the home to secure payment of these obligations
(R. 77-78, 104).

The lien was to be paid upon the sale of the

home, the appellant's cohabitation, or appellant's ceasing to use
the home as her primary

residence, within

two years of her

remarriage or 3 years from the date of decree, whichever occurred
first (R. 104-105).
The court awarded the appellant alimony in the sum of
$800.00 per month for one year after which the alimony decreased
to $700.00 per month for two years, then decreased to $500.00 per
month for two years and, thereafter, to $350.00 per month for
five years, after which time it would drop to $1.00 per year and
would terminate as provided by law (R. 78, 105).
The court declared that the case before it was not a
difficult one from either a legal or fact standpoint and did not
require

extensive

discovery,

then

ruled

that

a

reasonable

attorney's fee would be $3,500.00 and that since appellant had
paid $2,500.00 of that fee from funds acquired during the course
of the marriage, respondent should pay an additional $1,000.00
for

the

appellant's

attorney

fees

(R.

78-79,

106).

These

findings were made in the face of the proffer of counsel for the
appellant that there were two particular problems in this case
which required extensive discovery and preparation.

The first

was the discovery and presentation of the real income of the
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respondent and the second was evidence of the need for permanent
support for Shelley Rasband.

Also, he testified that the law

governing permanent alimony required careful preparation of the
case (Tr. 289-291).
The

decree

of

the

court

was

formally

entered

on

February 11, 1987f and appellant's notice of appeal was filed on
March 11, 1987.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The failure of the trial court after a twenty-nine

and one-half-year marriage to award substantial permanent alimony
to appellant who had a high-school education, married respondent
a few months after graduation, never worked at a full-time job
and who had not held a job in the recent past which paid her more
than a minimum wage, where the respondent could clearly afford to
pay the requested alimony which was consistent with the marital
standard of living, was an abuse of discretion and violation of
the standard governing awards of alimony established by the Utah
Supreme Court.
2.

The

trial

court

equally,

but

not

equitably,

divided the property of the parties in light of the length of the
marriage

of

the parties, the absence of work

experience by

appellant, the necessity of appellant's maintaining a home for
herself and the child of the parties who is unable to become
self-supporting, the work experience of the respondent throughout
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the marriage

of

the parties, during

which

experience, contacts and his own business.
equal distribution of the parties1

he

is obtaining

These factors make an

property

inequitable.

To

correct it and to make it equitable, the home and its furniture,
fixtures, furnishings

and appliances must be awarded

to the

appellant, as a basic minimum property distribution.
3.

The

failure

of

the

trial

court

to

award

a

reasonable attorney's fee on behalf of the appellant, ignoring
the difficulty of the case before it, compounded by the errors in
his other rulings, violated the provisions of § 30-3-3, UTAH CODE
ANN. (1953).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT SHOULD
PERMANENT ALIMONY.

HAVE

BEEN

AWARDED

This court has recently examined the issue of alimony
and declared:
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion
concerning alimony, Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986), states that the
purpose of spousal support is to "enable the
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse
from becoming a public charge. The appellate
courts should not interfere with such an
award without a showing of a 'clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.1 The court
in Paffel further sets forth what must be
considered by the trial court to avoid a
challenge to the award as being an abuse of
discretion.
These factors are, (1) the
financial condition and needs of the spouse
-14-

claiming support, (2) the ability of
spouse to provide sufficient income for
or herself, and (3) the ability of
responding spouse . . .
to provide
support.
Eames v. Eames f
i ;:IH " I „

55 Utah Adv. Npt.r. 4 9,

Tested dq.jinst

regard to

that
him
the
the

P. 2d

(Utah

I liest- ia«.Lurs the abuse of descretion in

the failure of the trial court to award financially

appropriate permanent alimony in tne

*s* iv

-.«.,, v - - — -

c lecii'.

The
unemployed.

appellant

has

She ' -.

last 3 0 years.

no
•

presen*
^

as

--<=

^

She marriec u few months ou~ ->r m e n school, has

had no further education

arxl

held o m y

part-time minimum wage

p o s 11 i o i i s £ o r s 1 I o i: t p e r I. o d s o f t i m e.
difficulties

Income

in transportation

She t e s 11 f i e d that she has

and with he- glasses.

She has

health problems which establ ish 1 imi tat ions oi i t h e t y p e c: f * : • c 1 i:
she

ouid accept.

I.s 'lie t a c e o f t h i s t e s t i m o n y t h e t r i a l c o u r t

determined that the appellant

-> capable c: meaningful

employment in the future" (n. / J>

?*- •
:• ,

this deter ruination and upon i*

for
• :.-

-:/L:-

V_:

declaring

alimony. It clearly violates the governing standards articulated
1•

*° Vr ih Supreme Court

(Utai

*

P.2d .4-

i i i English v. English, bbb P t"d H."^

evaluated and applied
.:-

. •'- • Higley v. Higley, 6" b p,::d P 3 iUtar 1983);

Jones v ._ w^L:^.
^4

in Gramme v. Gramme, 587

'

wisen v. Olsen r

704 P,,'d

'Utah 1985;; Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P.2d 991 (Utah 1986);
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and

Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d

96

(Utah

1986).

It

is a

determination based on nothing and is contrary to not only the
facts of the case but also the experience of our society as
recognized by and discussed by the Supreme Court in Hiqley v.
Hiqleyf

supraf where the court analyzed and applied the data

describing a woman's plight in seeking employment.
studies

demonstrate

the

situation

in

Utah

is

Recent Utah
even

worse.

"Governor's Task Force on Integrating Women Into the Workforce,"
Utah Women in Economic Crisis, June, 1984, § 2, p. 2, and Parks,
Lecia, "Hard at Work," Women in the Utah Labor Force, Aug. 1985,
§ IV, p. 6 and Chap. 4, p. 59.
Examining the factor of the need of appellant and her
ability

to

provide

income

for

herself

the

record

reveals

appellant testified that to maintain a household for herself and
Shelley, she requires $2,000.00 per month as income.

If the

appellant secures a job such as she has held in the recent past,
a minimum wage job, she could earn a gross, pre-tax income of
$3.35 per

hour, that

$589.60 per month.

is approximately

$134.00 per week and

With or without such a job she is in need of

the $1,500.00 per month alimony she requested.

If appellant

cannot obtain or hold a full-time minimum-wage job, her earnings
will be less.
On the other hand, the respondent had demonstrated a
long working history which included earning a gross income of
between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00 per year ~as a manager of
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insurance agents and at least $7,000.00 ;<
agent.

month a.

Accepting the determination c: • •

•

earns a net income of at least $3,fl0
he

W.3S

capable

appellant

of

i.: viding

.Dll

-

i-

the

- ntl 1.

-

* .•

month

alimony

"Fl i i i -„ i"

insurance
t
* ,

requested

by

t he

iindei* .1 1 ned hy Hie t HI f

that the S c h e d u l e C B u s i n e s s E x p e n s e D e d u c t i o n s , while

perfectly

lega. , include payment - . * substantial personal expenses, such ,-•
• •=

11 a 1 1 sp :

. i ni 1: 1 e 1 11 a 1 id

t r av e 1

f c• 1

:i e s p o n c - •

which increases r, • actual, available income to above $3,800.00
per month.
consider

The

failure of

these

income

the

factors

trial

court

violates

to

the

appropriately
guidelines

of

analyzing business income articulated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d
1072, 1075-76 (Utah 1985).
Thus,

the

record

demonstrates

both

the need

of

the

appellant for $1,500.00 per month as permanent alimony and the
:*

.

im.

T*

demonstrates the requested sum is consistent with m e
of

the parties.

This

failure violates

liresty.e

the direction

of

me

S1 1 preme Con 11 1: i 1 1 Hiqley v. Hiqley, supra.
The Utah Supreme Court has, in the recent past, tw*
considered the issue of permanent alimony in cases similar to the
instai it

111 HI 1 I-M

ami

1 e versed

decisions

financially appropriate permanent alimony
supra, the Court rule:; that it wa,
alimony in fhp fa^<=>

•» long-term
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>
•«

failing

to

awa r ^

Jones v. Jones,
:

i* •• ^

a,»- ^ t r e : r • + + :*•. ,a :

work or education producing an expectancy of self-support.

This

was not altered by her participation in the family business or
volunteer work.

Mrs. Jones, like appellant, did not have further

education or work experience which endowed her with an ability to
earn income at a self supporting rate.
Of a similar nature is the decision of the Utah Supreme
Court

in Olsen v. 01senr

awarding

alimony

which

supra, where the Court

ruled that

terminated

years

after

two

was

inappropriate where the wife had married immediately out of high
school and had not worked while raising a large family.
In both Jones , supra,and Olsen, supra, there was no
demonstrated ability of the wife to earn any substantial income
while such an ability had been demonstrated by their husbands.
That is equally true of the instant matter.
Subsequent

decisions

of

the Utah

Supreme

Court

in

Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P.2d 991 (Utah 1986) , and Paffel v.
Paffel, 732 P.2d

96

sustaining

awards

court

(Utah

1986),

of

applied

permanent

this

alimony

rationale
utilizing

in
the

criteria recapitulated by this court in Eames v. Eames, supra.
The instant case falls clearly within the articulated
guidelines for permanent alimony established by the Utah Supreme
Court and applied by this court in Eames v. Eames, supra, and
Bovle v. Boyle 55 Utah Adv. Rptr. 51,
The

appellant

enjoyed

a

standard

substantial entertaining and travel.
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P.2d
of

living

(Utah 1987).
that

involved

She ran a household on a

$4,000 , 00 per* month allowance .

She h a s no demonstrated abi 11ty

t • ::: 2 a i: i i a b e • e a i i t i n i n 11 in i v a • g e
intellectually-impaired
herself.

S h e m i I s 1: p r o ;'" I d e a 1 I o n i e f o r a n

child w h o will never b e able to support

T h e e r - r * ••- ~rial court

!' p v i •' J " s e 11 a n i. i

*-

in this matter must be

-

e qi i e s t e c:i a m c i 11 I t, $ 1 , 5 0 0 , 0

per month, should be awarded.
POINT 11
TO EQUITABLY DIVIDE THE PROPERTY OF THE
PARTIES, THE MARITAL HOME SHOULD BE AWARDED
TO THE APPELLANT.
The trial court divided the property
* -• ••-r-/ thi c

equal 1 y bet*; een them
not equitable.
The

parties

acquired

during

their

and appliances

Included

accumulated

- - •• *--•••

parties
: -. "

That inequity ;r.u=>t be corrected by *:. rus court.

fixtures, furnishings
marriage.

>

tlie

:r.e vii *"^e furniture,

intangible

t h e twenty-nine

.

: . • " -. ° •.*•
personal

and one-half

: their
property

years

of tlle

i nar r iage i s the bus iness acumen, bus iness contacts and bus iness
knowledge acquired b y t h e respondent while t h e appellant managed
the

f ami I

lousehold.

employmr-iv

n o w are tat -,pecif ic

assets

•: f

.:-.u.;-, u s e of them,, to woru fr\r~ .. -.ate Farm Insurance

responden
Company

Those

anc when
- :

::- determined
(

that

r- wished

h r , n v n insure

Making use of that knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e ,
own b u s i n e s s .

.• *

to leave
•

that

" e ::I:i ci s o .

:^ operating h i s

While h e h a s just started the business and it has
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a present

liquidation value of approximately

knowledge

and

experience

are

an

intangible

considerably more valuable than this sum.

$10,000.00, his
value

which

is

It will lend to the

growth of the business as he operates it.

This was neither

valued nor considered by the trial court.
While respondent was acquiring this asset the appellant
was providing care for the family and helping the respondent
conduct his businesses by maintaining the books and supporting
him in his activities.

Now that the respondent has chosen to

terminate the marriage, the appellant is left with no significant
income, earning experience, education or income-producing assets
and is required to provide a home for herself and the permanently
dependent child, Shelley.

To do this, she will require not just

the child support of $250.00 per month ordered by the court but
the existing, marital home.
trial

court

failed

In failing to provide this, the

to equitably

divide

the property

of

the

parties.
In making this challenge, the appellant acknowledges
the burden that she must meet in securing assistance on this
issue from this court.

This was recently articulated by the

Supreme Court in Alexander v. Alexander, 56 Utah Adv. Rptr. 31,
P.2nd

, (Utah 1987):

As long as a property division is made
within the standards set by this Court we
will not disturb the trial judge's decision.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; Burnham v.
Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). . .
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This Court endows the court's adjustment
of the financial interests of the parties
with the presumption of validity and does not
review their values absent a clear abuse of
discretion . , . We do not lightly disturb
the property divisions made by the trial
court and uphold its decision except where to
do so would work a manifest injustice or
inequity. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119
(citations omitted); See: Savage v. Savage,
658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1 983).
56 Utah Adv. Rptr. -K ' ;\ _

P.>d ir
• ^- t

justice as

equire this court M

si such .i man it est in

intervene.

Appellant acknowledges that an equal division
"f ^ ?

er t y i s :>i i i t s £ a :: e ai i e q u i t a b l e d i v i s :
ination of the facts and circumstances
from the dissolution of this

•;<— : ao

.
nn

J

l v : , t.-xam

• : :r. s :as^ tr.cv resul
- .

- -_

trial court's decision can be discerned.
The

t r I a1

< nourtf s

r e s p o n s ibi1i t y

in

dividing

p r o p e r t y h a s b e e n a i t i c i i ] a t e d b y t h e U t a h S u p r e in e C o u i -1 ,
It is the court's duty to make a division of
the property
and
income
in a
divorce
proceeding so that the parties may readjust
their lives to the new situation as well as
possible.
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah
573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). There is no fixed
rule or formula for the distribution of a
marital estate.
In MacDonald v. MacDonald,
supra, the Court listed 15 factors which may
be considered in adjusting the rights and
obligations of the parties.
They include:
the respective ages of the parties; what each
may have given up for the marriage; what
money or property each put into the marriage?
the physical and mental health of the
parties; the relative ability, training and
education of the parties; the duration of the
-21-

th

marriage; the present income of the parties;
the efforts
exerted
by the parties
in
acquiring
marital
property;
the
present
mental and physical age of the parties; the
life expectancy of the parties; the ability
of the wife to provide income for herself;
the ability
of
the husband
to provide
support.
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982).
In the instant case, the trial court did not carry out
the

primary

mandate

of

this

division of the property and

direction.

It

income so that

did

not

make

a

the parties could

readjust their lives to the new situation as well as possible.
Appellant must provide a household
mentally-impaired child of the parties.
job training
significant

that will

lead

for herself and a

She has no education or

to the expectancy

of

her

earning

income or accumulating significant assets with which

to do this. Respondent testified that he, at the time of trial,
was unaware of Shelley's current problems (Tr. 151-152).

He has

established his own apartment, his own business, takes his own
trips and has assumed

his own

life.

Appellant,

on the other

hand, not only cares for the mentally impaired child, but is very
much

involved

with

and

providing

assistance

to

as

well

as

receiving assistance from her other children, family and friends.
It

was

her

furniture

and

request

that

fixtures,

she

be

furnishes

awarded
and

the

house

and

its

appliances

to provide a

home for herself and the mentally-impaired child.

She plans to

make use of this resource by renting part of the space to college

-22-

students which w o u l d enable h e r to p r o v i d e additional income and
assistance-

* -'aiiiii'i H n

hi ujj.Hhn 1 <1 ,

This

home

r. t I' *•* M M ] }

asset w^t;

income-producing p o t e n t i a l w h i c h could be awarded

•_ jppe I . ar.r .
i1. i . li.'-n WIIM] H Mil1 i-ifties had ',< legal o r

A-

ongoing

obligations

propert

---.. ; >-.-.<-

stai

-

to their

children,,

--tii a p p r o p r i a t e ,
•

i <=; ^ r

that

ai 1 equal
However,

* r u *»

d i v i s i o n of

in the circum-

'• ^

^ppellBnf

continue - : provide <T- heme f, : herself and her chile.
not iiave tne jvnuwieuyti, wont e x p e r t : •
of the r e s p o n d e n t , y e t t h e trial
property

and ordered

declining

<*

Sr;~ c- - ;.

--v

cou - .ns -.:.vide; equally ::e
alimony.

* - three

years the

proper t y i s t : be equ a ] 1 y d i v i d ed by 1:1 I e s a ] i
parties.

for herself

p r o v i i'i i n g arid i t'}*"*

hon i e o f 11: I e

::f : r.e h e r ••? * -*

D o i n g this will require destruction

the appellant h a s m a i n t a i n e d

mncf

a n d ner daughter

win±e

respondent.

It war • • c respondent w h o d e t e r m i n e d that he r.o longer
wished *-o Liv-1 * ~

*.e appellant a n d m o v e d en it,

is allowing

T K j trial cc.'rt

simply equally d i v i d e t h e property a n d walk

away from t h e s i t u a t i o n that h e h a s c r e a t e d , that ; -. a * *- •<
: rspared
impa
'--.
agair

~.

«

;n;r,er
• >-

•

support

. ..ever i^
: .s- p r o v e d -

herse'*

*^

» m © f> s u p p o r t herself
-=•*
>•**<

Testing

r * :; .
5:.d t : *

* r <= :-3 *

Turner

^:~uation

v. Turner,

supra r

MacDonald v, MacDonald, 236 P,2d 1066 (Utah 1951) and Pinion v.
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Pinion, 67 P.2d 265 (Utah 1937), the error of the court becomes
obvious.

These factors have been discussed above and, in the

crucial areas of ability to provide for support obligations to
the dependent child and ability to pay, the trial court did not
correctly assess the evidence.
This error becomes even more apparent when decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court affirming awards that were not equal are
examined.

In the case of Pope v. Popef 589 P.2d 572 (Utah 1978),

the Utah Supreme Court held that an award of 65 percent of the
property

to

appropriate
attended

the
where

college

engineering

wife

and

there
and

35

were

percent
two

obtained

children,

both

and a master's degree

to

a

the

husband

was

the

husband

had

bachelor's

in business

degree

in

administration

while the plaintiff had terminated her education and spent her
time caring for the children.
P.2d

1289

(Utah

1978),

it

In Henderson v. Henderson, 576
was

held

appropriate

to

award

two-thirds of the property to the wife and one-third to the
husband

when

children.

the

husband

was

awarded

custody

of

the

five

In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), the court

held equitable a division of property which, according to the
defendant's figures, awarded two-thirds of the family property to
the wife and one-third to the husband or, according to the wife,
55 percent to her and 45 percent to the defendant.

In Yelderman

v. Yelderman, 669 P.2nd 406 (Utah 1983), a division of 56 percent
of the property to the wife and 44 percent of the property to the

-24-

husband was upheld even though the wife was also awarded alimony.
In W o r k m a n
Savage

v.

Workman,

652

;:

-

P. 2d 6?o

P.2d
•-.

W , * M : 1985)

p r o p e r 4 / 'c

(Utah

, <• .

division

* --.ie aiivi *

eqi lit .able.

931

1982),

:•! v>C percent

r he marital

-- o •••••-\

percent tu t:*-

under

h^*- husband 1 C

assets.

i

calculatio.

Each

^"«

•-

circulations

• -..*:

-.

• .-

*h;rr,

^

:•

^ .
;

'

received

he rases presented

bi it,
equal -JIV-.S.

-

--

-i^c...

Supreme Court affirmed a p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n
her

v.

Berger v. Berger y 1713

Turner v. T u r n e r , 649 P*^..;

under

Savage

=

percent

:

different fact s i t u a t i o n ,

i .

.

:, :>r opi "late that an

issets vas nit ecj-.t-ip/ie, 'hat the

required an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p r o p e r t i e s .

equities
Ii\ any of

these cases r an equal -J IV is ion would have been inequitable.

That

is true of the instant case and requires the intervention of this
court.
POINT III.
THE
TRIAL
COURT
SHOULD
HAVE
AWARDED
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES ON BEHALF OF THE
APPELLANT.
The trial coi irt n i] e d t h a 4

* "l •; ,: •

should have been prepared and tried iur $3,50C. 1..

-, •
h>

court determined that since the appellan* *:a : -3ised ^2,500.00 ui
this on h<rj i
$1,000.00

-

i A 11 In )in t i m'iK
- ::-<-- '

ti< q i i i

' - H respondent.
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^ marriao^,
That was an erroneous

nniu

ruling under the guidelines established by the Utah Supreme Court
for application of § 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) and this court
should

reverse

or modify

that

ruling

and

award

appropriate

attorney fees both for the trial and this appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Kerr v. Kerrf 610 P.2d
1380

(Utah

1980),

that

a court

in a divorce

proceeding

is

empowered to award attorney's fees pursuant to § 30-3-3, UTAH
CODE ANN. (1953).

The decision to make the award and the amount

awarded rests primarily with the sound discretion of the trial
court based on evidence of need and reasonableness, 610 P.2d at
1384.

The Supreme Court declared that issues which should be

considered in making the award are whether or not the plaintiff
would be unable to cover the costs of the litigation, 610 P.2d at
1384, and whether the plaintiff or defendant would be better able
to pay the fees in light of the property award, 610 P.2d at 1384.
The court noted that there must be testimony in regard to the
reasonableness of fee, the rates charged, the difficulty of the
case, the result accomplished and the rates commonly charged for
divorce actions in the community should be considered, 610 P. 2d
at 1384-85.

The court went on to observe:

The lawyer's service may include the
sharing and identifying with his client in
problems in the deepest emotional content,
such as losing or the saving of family
relationships, or even at time of life
itself, wherein the extremes of sorrow or of
happiness may depend upon his failure or
success. Some observation can be made in a
lessor degree in regard to business matters
-26-

in which his role is to provide the foundation, guidance and protection of vital rights
and property interest.
All of these may be
materially affected by the quality of service
of the 1 awyer chosen to serve in such matter,
The choice of a lawyer and the value -:
his services may depend upon a number o:
factors including his background of learning
and experience, his ability, his integrity
and dedication to the causes with which he
identifies himself. Also to be considered is
the reputation he has acquired, the nature
and the importance of the matter, and the
amount
of
money
or
value
of
property
involved.
There is also the matter of how
the lawyer is to be paid:
cash in advance,
extended credit, whether a fixed amount or
contingent on success, or other conditions,
What the lawyer has to offer should be
determined by considering the composite of
all of these factors which the party themselves think relevant.
Within the limits of
reason and good conscience, and where there
is
no
over-reaching,
undue
influence
or
oppression, the parties should be at liberty
to contract as they desire.
610 P.2d at 1 385.
Delatore

v.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed this rationale in

Delatore,

or'

(Utah

Cottrell, 694 P.2d 62? (Utah ^ t In
testified
f am i i y

the

that
1aw

he
("I r.

instant

matter,

+^^^

and

Cabrera

counsel
•

for

the

appellant

-* *

^ : ^f

*- h -. q u u . *.

*

- :\ ^ ;. : - -

recognized by hi s election as a Fellow in the American Academy

Ma t r imo ny

I a wye r s

problems faced

(T i

v.

.

^a^> s p e c i a n ^

1984)

2 8 9 ) a nd

in this case, hidden

11 I a t

1: I I e i: e

income, permanent

of a child and the need for permanent alimony
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we i: e

f

parti c

dependence

(Tr. 289-291).

He

testified that while his billing rate was above the going rate in
the community, he thought the charges were reasonable because of
the particular problems presented by the case (Tr. 289-291).

He

testified he had utilized the services of a legal assistant to
reduce the charges incurred and believed that those, too, were
reasonable

(Tr. 289-91) and appropriately should be awarded.

Continental Townhouses East v. Brockbanky 733 P.2d 1120 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987).
In rejecting this testimony and ruling that the case
was a simple one, the trial court did not analyze the testimony
presented or issues involved.

This is highlighted by the action

of the trial court itself in requesting a third opinion regarding
Shelley's condition and his errors in failing to correctly apply
governing law.
The evidence was clear that the appellant has no cash
with which to pay her attorney and that she had borrowed most of
the required retainer from her daughter who raised the funds by
cashing in the daughter's IRA.

This did not pay the full bill.

The trial court did not set out his analysis, simply
his ruling, thus, this court must review that ruling in light of
the

totality

of

the

evidence

and,

in

this

regard,

if

it

determines that appellant's position is correct, that the alimony
award is an error, the property award is in error and the trial
court had difficulty in determining the issue of the disability
of Shelley, then, it would also be true that the trial court
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erred

in failing

- understand

appeared so simple.

the case, which e x p l a v

That error now inquires this r o y

v~.y
'

the trial court to assess an appropriate attorney fee, ir;:luding
attorney's fees required ;• coming to this court to readdress the
actions he 1: ia• :I t a k e i 1 f i

,/..- ] 1 ai 11 h e Jl i e * e s tIII: 1 e f e e s :i i 1 cur red i n

bringing this matter before this court should also be

assessed

pursuant to § 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953).
CONCLUSION
Appellai it seeks a permanent alimony award of $1,500.00
per month

to which

twenty-nine

and

she believes

one-half-year

that: she

ma r r i a g e

is entitled, after a

i ip o n

w h i c1I sh e

immediately after graduation from high schoo.:
full-time

employment

respondent did,
now

operates

during

the

course

of

e i 11 e r e c:i

-: - :.i not hold
the

marriage;

the

Mf ln.ii It up subs tdin i d 1 business expertise and

his

own

business.

Respondent

can

afford

the

requested alimony and the amount requested is consistent wi t .h tl: le
] i festy] e of t .1 le p :

*

r the criteria established by the

courts of the State of L,tah, applying

+

r.e provisions of § 30-3-5,

UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 = , tue trial court p-red ir ' ,
1

.-

!,•-• , rqaesi e..i h«ei :i> - - nt alimony to the r:^*n: ;: f .
The trial court failed to equitably divide the property

, - * (. parties.
- ;..*a:i;'.

This is one of those I iniqi le cases where equal is
The failure of the trial court to recognize this

and n:s failure to award the plaintiff all of the eqi lity of the
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parties in their home must be corrected by this court in view of
the totalty of the circumstances, that

is, the need of the

appellant to maintain a home for herself and the permanently
dependent child of the parties, the need of the appellant for the
income

potential

respondent

of

of

the

home,

his business

the

necessary

and business

award

to

the

experience, and the

ability of the respondent to make use of legitimate business
expenses to enhance his actual income.
Finally,

this

court

should

require

payment

by

the

respondent of an appropriate attorney's fee reversing the trial
court's erroneous determination that a minimal fee is all that
respondent should pay.

In addition, the court should require the

respondent to pay the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the
appellant in bringing this appeal before the court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of May, 1987.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
of ana tor
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorney for Appellant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: 532-1234
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Mr. Pete Vlahos
Attorney at Law
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL BOURNE RASBAND,
Plaintiff,
o

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs-

>2UJr.

CAROL T. RASBAND,
U CC C/> ^

CIVIL NO: 39262

Defendant.

£ -J ^ O

<2i8

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the
5th day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Rodney S.
Page, one of the Judges in the above-entitled Court, sitting
without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and
with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, David S. Dolowitz; and
it having been shown that the Defendant was duly served with
a copy of the Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and
wherein the Defendant filed her Answer and Counterclaim,
that each of the parties having been sworn and testifying in
their own behalf, Exhibits having been offered and received,

FILMED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

witnesses having been called by both Plaintiff and Defendant, and the Court having taken said matter under advisement and having rendered its Memorandum Decision in writing,
and the Court being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff and Defendant have both been actual

and bona fide residents of Davis County, State of Utah, for
at least three (3) months prior to the commencement of this
action.
2.

That Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt

Lake City, Utah, on August 20, 1957, and ever since said
time have been and still are husband and wife; that there
have been four (4) children born as issue of this marriage,
three (3) of the children are emancipated and one (1) minor
child, to-wit: Russell Brian Rasband, born April 5, 1969,
and that both parents are fit and proper persons to have the
care, custody and control of the minor son.
3.

That

the

Court

finds

that' the

Defendant

has

treated Plaintiff cruelly and that Plaintiff has treated
Defendant cruelly in that each is unable to get along with
the other party, rendering further marital relations between
the parties intolerable.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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4.

That the parties daughter, Shelly Rasband, is 24

years of age, but suffers from a condition caused by shrinkage of the brain tissue which occurred prior to her birth or
shortly thereafter.
5.

That Shelly has graduated from high school and has

acquired 180 plus hours of college credit over 5 years that
she has attended Weber State College.
6.

That Shelly has some problems with

fine motor

skills and with tasks that require reasoning.
7.

That Shelly1 s IQ is in the low normal or border-

line range.
8.

That the classes that Shelly has taken in college

have not helped her to become more independent or trained
her

for

any vocation where

she could make

an adequate

living.
9.
of

her

That the Court has some question as to the degree
impairment

and

whether

she

can

become

self-supporting.
10.

That the Plaintiff is self-employed as an agent

for State Farm and has been since 1985.

Prior to 1985 the

Plaintiff was an agent/manager from 1977 until 1985.
11.

That the Court finds that from Plaintiff's trans-

fer from an agent/manager to an agent that it has meant a

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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substantial reduction in income and fringe benefits for the
Plaintiff.
12.

That

the

Plaintiff

generates

approximately

$6,909.00 per month gross income per month from the business
and that Plaintiff's expenses in regard to the running of
the agency run approximately 50% of his gross income, so
that after paying the business expenses, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has approximately $3,800.00 per month before
taxes to meet family expenses.
13.

That the Court finds that the Defendant is unem-

ployed but has a high school degree, that she has managed
the bills of the marriage and has assisted the Plaintiff in
his business and is fully capable of meaningful employment
in the future.
14.

That the Court finds that Defendant's needs are

between $1,250.00 and $1,400.00 per month.
15.

The

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff

has

needs

of

approximately $1,500.00 per month including the payment of
the family debts.
16.

That

the Defendant

has

an

older

daughter

and

friend of the family residing with her presently who contribute approximately $200.00 per month towards the family
expenses.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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17.

The Court

finds that the parties have a home

located in Kaysville, Utah, with a fair market value of
approximately

$125,000.00

and

there

is

approximately

$52,000.00 mortgage on the family home.
18.

That the Court finds that Plaintiff has approxi-

mately $10,000.00 which he would receive from State Farm
should he leave the agency that he has with State Farm which
is the residual he has built up in connection with his
agency.
19.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has also acquired a

retirement from State Farm which is totally vested.
20.

That the Court finds that the parties have in-

curred the following debts and obligations, to-wit:

State

Farm Credit Union of approximately $24,000.00, $4,000.00 of
which is for the Pontiac automobile, and the balance for the
Plaintiff's Lincoln automobile, for monies he borrowed for
the business and the car that he purchased for his son.
That in addition the Plaintiff has a loan to Commercial
Security Bank Mastercard of approximately $2,400.00, Commercial Security Bank VISA of approximately $1,390.00, Commercial Security Bank Gold Mastercard of $3,000.00, Commercial
Security Bank Guarantee Card/Wife's overcharges of $860.00,
Dr. Belnap of $450.00, Dr. John Stinner - Defendant's dental
expenses

-

of

$433.00,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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State

5

Farm

Life

Insurance

of

$9,866.00, Bon Marche of $200.00, Castletons of $292.00,
ZCMI's of $400.00, Family Bank of $6,000.00, and that the
Court

finds that

expenses

except

from
the

the above debts, all are family

$20,000.00

borrowed

on

Plaintiff's

Lincoln automobile for sums used in the business, the Gold
Masterchard, the State Farm Life insurance loan, and the
debt due and owing Family Bank, said family debts total
$9,992.00.
21.

That the Court finds that the parties each have an

IRA account of $7,500.00.
22.

That the Defendant has a life insurance policy

with a $2,000.00 cash value, and that Plaintiff has a life
insurance policy with a cash value, but he has borrowed the
value of that cash value and utilized the funds in the
business.
23.

That the parties have acquired two

(2) sets of

wedding rings for the Defendant during the course of the
marriage, each valued at $3,500.00; one (1) set is a gift to
the Defendant and therefore not included as a value, the
other

was

purchased

by

the

parties

from

the

insurance

carrier after it was lost and has a value of $3,500.00.
24.

That

the

Defendant

withdrew

approximately

$8,500.00 from family accounts in the summer of 1985, some

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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was used on family expenses and other sums are unaccounted
for.
25.

That the Plaintiff received certain sums of money

as an inheritance from his parents, that those sums were
comingled with family funds and used by the family either in
paying expenses or setting up savings accounts.
26.

That the Plaintiff has retained Attorney Pete N.

Vlahos to represent the Plaintiff and the Defendant has
retained Attorney David S. Dolowitz to represent the Defendant and each has incurred attorney fees and costs.
27.

That Defendant has already paid to her attorney,

David S. Dolowitz, the sum of $2,500.00.
28.

That

from the above and

foregoing Findings of

Fact, the Court arrives at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff, Russell Bourne Rasband, is

entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Carol T.
Rasband, and the Defendant Carol T. Rasband is entitled to a
Decree

of

Divorce

from

the

Plaintiff,

Russell

Bourne

Rasband, said divorce to become final upon the signing and
entry.
2.

That the Defendant is awarded the care, custody

and control of the minor child, Russell Brian Rasband, born

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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April 5f 1969, subject to the Plaintiff's right to visit at
all reasonable times and places.
3.

That the Court reserves ruling on the dependency

of Shelly Rasband, age 24, and orders that the minor child,
Shelly, be evaluated by the Davis County Mental Health to
determine her degree of impairment, if any, and whether she
is capable of self-care and support.
amination is to be paid by the Plaintiff.

Cost of said exThe Court contin-

ues the matter relative to her support for a period of three
(3) months or until February 24, 1987, on the question of
ZliJr-
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continued support.
4.

That during the pendency, the support order shall

be the Plaintiff is to pay support for two children at the
rate of $250.00 per month per child.
5.

That the Defendant is awarded the Pontiac automo-

bile with a value of $2,500.00 and Plaintiff is to have the
transmission repaired, Defendant is awarded the furniture
and fixtures in her possession with the exception of the
following:
The office Desk
The file trays
The Spaulding Manuscript book
The books on Great Discussions
The guitar amplifier

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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The slide projector and screen
The pictures from Plaintiff's mother's estate
The round mantel clock
The Silver and Wooden case
The two Stifle lamps
That the value of the furniture awarded to the Defendant is determined to be $10,000.00.
6.

That Defendant is further awarded the two sets of

wedding rings, one being valued for settlement purposes in
the amount of $3,500.00, her life insurance cash surrender
value of $2,000.00 and her IRA account of $7,500.00, and
that the total value of the personal property awarded to the
Defendant is $25,500.00.
7.

That Plaintiff is awarded the right to the de-

ferred premium of the business valued at $10,000.00, the
Suzuki motorcycle valued at $800.00, the Lincoln automobile
valued at $800.00, the furniture and fixtures and items set
forth valued at $1,800.00, his IRA valued at $7,500.00, his
life insurance which has no cash value he having borrowed
the same, and the Court determines the personal property
awarded to the Plaintiff has a value of $20,100.00.
8.

That Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge

the balance of the family debts which include $4,000.00 of
the

State

Farm

Credit

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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loan, Commercial

Security

Mastercard - $2,400.00, the Commercial Security Bank VISA $1,390.00,

Commercial

Security

Bank

Guarantee

Card

$860.00, Dr. Belnap - $450.00, Dr. John Stinner - $433.00,
Bon

Marche

-

$200.00, Castletons

-

$292.00,

ZCMI•s

-

$400.00, having a total sum of $9,992.00, and is to hold the
Defendant harmless.
9.

That the Plaintiff is awarded the business of the

parties and to assume those debts incurred in the business
including $20,000.00 to the State Farm Credit Union, the
$9,866.00 to the State Farm Life Insurance loan, and to
Family Bank - $6,000.00, and the Court feels that the value
of the income potential of the business obligations offsets
those debts.
10.

That Defendant is awarded the home of the parties

subject to the exiting mortgage thereof, provided however,
the home is to be appraised within thirty

(30) days, and

from

shall

the

equity

therein,

the

Plaintiff

receive

$9,992.00 to reimburse him for the payment of the family
debts plus $5,400.00 to equalize the Value of the personal
property received by the respective parties, and the balance
of the equity shall be divided equally between the parties.
The parties are to share equally the cost of the appraisal.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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11.
real

That Plaintiff shall be granted a lien against the

property

to

secure

the

payment

of

the

sums

as

hereinabove set forth.
12.

That Plaintiff is to receive said sums upon the

sale of the home, the Defendant's co-habitation, the Defendant ceasing to use the home as her primary residence,
within two (2) years of her remarriage, or three (3) years
from the date of the Decree, whichever occurs first.
13.

That in the event the home is sold, the Plaintiff

is to share in the costs of sale in the same percentage that
the lien amount hereinabove

granted bears to the total

equity in the home at the time of sale.
_ ->>^i-:7

14.

That Plaintiff

*-*

^

h& maintain health and accident

insurance on his son, Russell, and also Shelly, so long as
the company will allow, provided however, that each of the
parties are to share equally any non-covered medical expenses on any minor child, and the Court reserves the issue
concerning

the

medical

expenses

on

Shelly

for

further

determination.
15.

That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the

sum of $800.00 per month alimony for a period of one (1)
year, thereafter said alimony shall decrease to the sum of
$700.00

for two

(2) years, $500.00

for two

(2) years,

thereinafter $350.00 for an additional five (5) years, after

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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which it shall be reduced to $1.00 per year.

Said alimony

shall terminate as provided by law.
16.

That the Defendant is hereby awarded one-half of

Plaintiff's interest in any retirement benefits obtained by
the Plaintiff from State Farm Insurance Company during the
course

of

the marriage

as provided

under

the Woodward

decision and shall be payable to the Defendant in said
proportion

when

the

Plaintiff

commences

receiving

said

retirement.
17.

That the Court determines that the case before the

Court is not a difficult one from a law or fact standpoint
and one not requiring extensive discovery.

The Court fees

that a reasonable attorney's fee for the Defendant would be
$3f500.00, she has paid $2,500.00 of said fee from monies
acquired during the course of the marriage and the Plaintiff
is ordered to pay an additional $1,000.00 to the Defendant
for the use and benefit of her attorney.
DATED this

H

day of ^^oua^y3, 1987.
BY THE COtJRT:

(PiCriViAJUf \# < s
rtOHtfRABLE/ RODNEY sV PAGE
D i s t r i c f c - ' C o u r t Judge
J

APPROVED AS TO FORM;

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Defendant
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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RUSSELL BORNE RASBAND,
Plaintiff,
vs

:

CAROL T. RASBAND,

RULING
C i v i l No.

39262

Defendant.

'1 1 le Coi irt having heard the testimony in the above-entitled
matter and having reviewed the evidence presented by "tr • parties
and being fully advvised in the premises, hereby rules as follows:
1.

The parties were married on August 20,1957, that each

were residents of Davis County at least,
fil

. • •
2.

three' months prior to the

complaint in this matter.

That four children have been born as issue of the

marriage and only one of said children has not reached his
majori y
3-

That the parties daughter, Shelly, is now 24 years of

age but suffers from a condit.1011 eaus>ed by shrinkage of the brain
tissue which occurred prior to her birth or shortly thereafter.
-

That; Shelly has graduated from high school and has

acquired 180+ hours nf college credit over five years.

FILMED

5.

That she has some problem with fine motor skills and

with tasks which require reasoning.
6.

That her I.Q. is in the low-normal or borderline range.

7.

That the classes she has taken at college have not

helped her to become more independent or trained her for any
vocation where she could make an adequate living.
8.

That the Court has some question as to the degree of her

impairment and whether she can be self supporting.
9.

That plaintiff is employed as an agent for State Farm

and has been since 1985.

Prior to that time he was an

agent/manager from 1977 until 1985.
10.

That going from agent/manager to agent has meant a

substantial reduction in income and fringe benefits for the
party.
11.

That plaintiff generates approximately $6909.00 per

month gross income per month from the business, that plaintiff's
expenses in regards to the running of the agency run
approximately 50% of that gross income.
12.

That after paying business expenses, the Court finds

that defendant has approximately $3800 per month before taxes to
meet family expenses.
13.

That the Court finds that the defendant is unemployed

but has a high school degree and has managed the bills of the
marriage and has assisted plaintiff in his business and is
capable of meaningful employment in the future.

')

14.

That the defendant has needs "f between Z\2lA)

arit 1 S H O O

per month.
15.

That the plaintiff has needs of approximately $1500 per

month, including the payment ni f\inu i / debt, s.
16.

Tl lat defendant has an older daughter and friend of the

family residing with her presently who contribute approximately
$200 per month In fr4iriily expenses,
17.

The parties have acquired a home i

Kaysville with a

market value of approximately $125,000 and th€ • owf- approximately
$52,000 on ihd't home .
18.

That plaintiff has coming from State Farm approximately

$10,000 which he would receive from State Farm should he- leave
immediate]y.
19.

That plaintiff has also acquired a retirement from

State Farm.
20.

That the parties have acquired debts during the course

of the marriage, certain for family expenses and certain for
business expenses.
21.

That the plaintiff has a loan to State Farm Credit

Union for approximately $24,000; $4,000 of that is for the
Pontiac automobile and thii- balance is fui his Lincoln automobile,
for monies borrowed for the business and a car he bought for his
son.
22.

Thai plaintiff aJsn ha"- « Commercial Security Bank gold

card and a loan from the family bank which were both used for
business purposes.

W

23.

The parties have family debts as set forth in

plaintiff's Exhibit A, page 2, as Items 1 ($4,000 of which is
family debt), Item 2, Item 3, Item 5, Item 6, Item 7, Item 9,
Item 10 and Item 11, totalling $9,992.00.
24.

That the parties have each acquired an IRA of $7500.00.

25.

That defendant has a life insurance policy with a

$2,000 cash value and plaintiff has a life insurance policy with
a cash value but that he has borrowed the value of that cash
value.
26.

That the parties have acquired two sets of wedding

rings for the defendant during the course of the marriage, each
valued at $3500.00; one is a gift to the defendant and therefore
not valued, the other was purchased by the parties from insurance
carrier after it was lost and has a value of $3500.00.
27.

Defendant withdrew approximately $8500.00 from family

accounts in the summer of 1985.

Some was used on family

expenses, other sums are unaccounted for.
28.

That plaintiff received certain sums as an inheritance

from his parent, that those sums were co-mingled with family
funds and used by the family in either paying expenses or setting
up savings accounts.
From the foregoing, the Court concludes as follows:
1.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce from

the other to become final upon entry.

0

2,

That the defendant is awarded the care and custody of

the minor child of" tlie paiiies subject to reasonable rights of
visitation I n the plaintiff.
3,

That the Court reserves ruling un tn* ^ - .•*•*•

Shelly and orders thai ntm- bt- rvdluated by r»=a, ..- County Mental
Health to determine her degree of impairment,

t -v-v

<-f ^ -whether

she Is capable of self-care and support
examinat ion Is to be po) d by the plaintiff.

The Court continues

the matter relative to her support for a period of three months
until February 24, 1987 on the question of continued support.
4,

Tfi.it pending determination of the support order

defendant is to pay support for the two children at the r ate of
$250 per month per child.
5,

That the defendant is awarded the Pontiac automobile
* H , - the transmission

with a value of $2500 and plaintiff : •; *
repaired, the fuTnitu?*' and IIXOIJI* .

^,

possession with the

excepti on of the office desk, the file trays, the Spaulding
manuscript book, the books on "Great Discussions", the guitar
amplifier, t N" sli(J*j piujector and screen, the pictures from
plaintiff's mother's estate, the round mantle clock,,, the silver
and wooden case and two Stiffle lamps

The- value o«f the

furniture awarded to pi ainti ff was given $10,000.
fi

Defendant is further awarded the two sets of wedding

rings, one being valued ioi beitie^'it purposes at, the amount of
$350

;

*>

:•

her IR£ <- : $7500. .

nsurance wi th a cash value of $2000.00 and

7.

The total value of the personal property items awarded

to the defendant is $25,500.00.
8.

The plaintiff is awarded the right to the deferred

premiums in the business valued at $10,000.00; the Suzuki
motorcycle valued at $800.00; the Lincoln auto valued at $800.00;
the furniture and fixtures and items set forth above valued at
$1800.00; his IRA valued at $7500.00; his life insurance which
has no cash value he having borrowed the same.
9.

The value of the personal property awarded to the

plaintiff is $20,100.00.
10.

That the plaintiff is ordered to assume the balance of

the family debts in the sum of $9,992.00 and hold defendant
harmless thereon.
11.

Plaintiff is awarded the business of the parties and to

assume the debts thereon the Court feeling that the value of the
income potential of the business offsets these debts.
12.

Defendant is awarded the home of the parties subject to

the mortgage thereon.

The home is to be appraised within thirty

days and from the equity therein the plaintiff should receive
$9,992.00 to reimburse him for payment of family debts; in
addition he should receive from the equity the sum of $5,400.00
to equalize the value of the personal property received by the
parties; and the balance of the equity should be divided between
the parties.

The parties are to share equally the cost of the

appraisal.

'7

I hat, plaintiff should be granted a lien against the.
real property to secure the payment of the sums as set forth
above.
14.

Those sums are to pad d to the plaintiff upon the sale

of the home, upon defendant's cohabitation, upon defendant
ceasing to use the fionit» r*s h<jt ||n nil. ry residence, within two
years of her remarriage, oi three years from the date of the
decree, whichever occurs first.
t*** plaintiff is 4"-

:i i iR snirf

15.
share in t

. -: •• : t-a.f- in the same percentage - ha- *-\~ .

amount hereinabove granted bears iu i:ne *
at i/he ti 16.

-

*

-

me

.

Plaintiff is to maintain health and accident insurance

on his son and Shelly so long a>> t hi- company will cillow,

The

parties are to share equally any non-covered medical expense on
any minor child and the Court reserves the issue relative to
Shelly for further determi nati on.
17.

The Court further orders that the plaintiff is to pay

to the defendant alimony in the amount oi S6u0 per month for a
period of one yeai , a 1terwhjch said

limony shall decrease to the

sum of $700 per month for two years ~.

; N

5C * fir two years and

thereafter $350 i •- an additional five years ai whi» h time i t
sha:
provided by law.

;-

,:

alimony is to terminate as

18.

That the defendant is hereby awarded a 1/2 interest in

any retirement benefit obtained by the plaintiff from State Farm
during the course of the marriage as provided under the Woodward
decision.
19.

Court finds that the case before the Court is not a

difficult one from a law or fact standpoint and one not requiring
extensive discovery.

The Court feels that a reasonable

attorney's fee for defendant would be $3500 and that she paid
$2500 of said fee from monies acquired during the course of the
marriage and finding that she is presently unemployed orders that
the plaintiff pay an additional $1,000.00 to the defendant for
the use and benefit of her attorney.
Plaintiff's counsel is to prepare Findings and Decree in
accordance with the court's ruling and submit a copy to
defendant's counsel before submitting to the Court.
DATED this

ft*^

day of December, A.D. 1986.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge fl

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on I he

/O ^

dtiy"

I mailed a true and correct copy of the forego
prepaid,

to the following:

Pete N. Vlahos
Attorney for Plaintiff
2447 Keisel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Defendant
185 South State
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

